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Introduction
Over the past 25 years, the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada have not 
exhibited the divergent policy views along party lines that have been characteristic of 
the justices of the United States Supreme Court. This apparent lack of partisan 
polarization in Canada may at first give rise to smugness about the appointments 
process in Canada; after all, our process appears to have successfully sidestepped the 
politicization associated with the U.S. nomination and confirmation system.1 
However, before any claim that the Canadian appointments process is in fact 
superior can be made or defended, it is necessary to understand what this lower level 
of politicization implies about the judicial decision-making process and the quality of 
adjudication by our Court relative to the U.S. Supreme Court. We will argue that 
whether the relatively nonpartisan nature of the Supreme Court in Canada is 
advantageous depends on a number of assumptions, such as the nature of the 
appointments process, the characteristics of the justices who are appointed in each 
system, and the decision-making processes used by the justices on each Court.
The debate over the most appropriate process for appointing justices to the 
Supreme Court of Canada rests on a number of empirical assumptions. Key among 
these is the assumption that the justices decide cases at least partly in accordance 
with their personal policy preferences. This assumption underlies two conflicting 
policy prescriptions. The first policy prescription is that it is in the interests of an 
open and democratically accountable judiciary for the appointments process to 
gravitate towards U.S.-style nominations, hearings, and confirmation. If justices are 
going to rely on personal policy preferences to guide their decision-making, then it 
stands to reason that these policy preferences should be tested and vetted openly and
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publicly by the citizens who will be affected by the decisions. The second 
prescription is nearly the opposite: that the appointments process should be 
depoliticized by adopting a more neutral, bipartisan (or multi-partisan) committee 
system. Because personal policy preferences will inevitably guide judicial decision­
making, certain safeguards ought to be implemented to prevent partisan allegiance 
from systematically biasing those policy preferences. The idea is that judging is an 
activity that ought to be separate and distinct from party politics, and that the justices 
who are selected ought to be the candidates with the most legal talent and highest 
levels of professionalism, not the candidates with the views most congenial to the 
political party in power. After all, for a nation’s highest court to be effective in 
ensuring the government of the day does not abuse its power or infringe upon 
minority protections, it ought not to be beholden to or aligned with the government. 
The judiciary, on this view, must be independent, and it can only be independent if 
appointments are not driven by partisan political considerations.
There is a significant and growing literature addressing the connection between 
judges’ policy preferences and their voting in cases in the U.S.2 With some well- 
known exceptions, such as Justice John Paul Stevens, this literature tends to find a 
clear difference in how justices on the U.S. Supreme Court vote, depending on 
whether they were appointed by a Republican or Democratic president.3 In Canada, 
under a very different appointment process, recent empirical research has found that 
there is a much weaker connection between how justices vote on divisive cases and 
the Prime Minister who appointed them. Generally, Canadian Supreme Court justices 
appear to agree more often than the justices do in the U.S. and, when they disagree, 
the lines of disagreement are less predictable than in the U.S.4
How these general findings are viewed depends on how they are framed. If one 
takes the position that there is one clear “right” answer to each legal question, one 
may be tempted to argue that the lack of partisan predictability in Canada is good. 
Ideally, a well-functioning panel of justices will be better able than any one 
individual to sort through the strength of the competing arguments and arrive at the 
best answer possible. A well-constituted and professional panel will draw on the 
collective experience and combined intelligence of its members to arrive at an 
answer that is more likely to be correct than the conclusion of any single justice. The 
observation that justices in Canada do not diverge as greatly in their decisions,
2 The empirical literature on judging (at the Supreme Court and Federal Court levels) has grown rapidly 
recently. See, e.g. Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model 
Revisited (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Are Judges 
Political? An Empirical Analysis o f the Federal Judiciary (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2006); Andrew D. Martin et al., “Competing Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court 
Decisionmaking” (2004) 2 Perspectives on Politics 761.
3 Justice John Paul Stevens was appointed by President Ford, a Republican, but is by most estimations 
among the most liberal (if not the most liberal) justice serving on the Court.
4 Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, “Policy Preference Change and Appointments to the Supreme Court 
of Canada”(Paper presented at the 2nd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, New York 
University Law School, 9 November 2007), online: Social Science Research Network 
<http://ssm.com/abstract=1013560>. See CLUSTERS AND EXTREMES: VOTING ON THE CANADIAN AND 
US SUPREME C o u r t s ,  below, for a discussion of the literature in this area.
particularly in accordance with some commonly used indicators of judicial 
ideological bias (such as the appointing Prime Minister’s party), may indicate that 
the Canadian Supreme Court justices are, on the whole, basing their decisions to a 
greater extent on the merits of each case and to a significantly lesser extent on their 
personal political views.
Yet this raises a host of questions. Does the weak degree of predictability in the 
decision-making of the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada indicate that they 
are able to set aside their personal policy preferences and rationally deliberate to a 
common understanding? Or, alternatively, do the justices simply happen to have 
similar policy preferences? How do the policy preferences of our justices relate to 
the values of the Canadian public and Canadian legislators? Further, if the justices 
do begin deliberations with divergent views but ultimately tend to converge in voting 
on the disposition of appeals, is the convergence the result of principled and 
professional deliberation or is there an element of logrolling present?
This forum contribution begins the examination of these questions in the 
context of the U.S. and Canadian Supreme Courts. It discusses the relationship 
between two potential determinants of a justice’s votes: personal policy preferences 
and the extent and nature of cooperation between justices on the Court at a given 
time.5 To set the context, Part 2 briefly outlines the main findings of some recent 
empirical research on judicial voting behaviour at the Supreme Court of Canada and 
compares it to similar empirical studies of the U.S. Supreme Court. Part 3 sets out a 
framework for analyzing the difference in voting patterns based on the extent to 
which a justice votes in accordance with her policy preferences and the extent to 
which the justices of a multi-member court can be characterized as cooperative or 
collegial. Part 4 uses this framework to assess the different voting patterns on the 
Canadian and U.S. Supreme Courts and discusses the important normative tradeoff 
between deliberation (“positive” cooperation) and logrolling (“negative” 
cooperation). Finally, Part 5 briefly discusses the connection of this normative 
tradeoff to the appointments process, and identifies some additional considerations to 
guide future theoretical and empirical research.
C lusters and Ex trem es : Votin g  on th e  Canadian and U.S. Suprem e  
C ourts
Various approaches have been taken to assessing the policy preferences of the 
justices of the Supreme Court of Canada as well as the U.S. Supreme Court. Despite 
the variety of methodological approaches reported in the literature, there are 
regularities that emerge in the empirical results. If the justices of the U.S. Supreme 
Court are positioned on a spectrum from most conservative to most liberal, justices
5 There are other potential determinants o f judicial voting, including strategic considerations concerning 
the relationship between the courts and the legislature or the executive. See e.g. Segal & Spaeth, supra 
note 2; Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, The Choices Justices Make (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1998). As 
discussed below, this paper focuses on the attitudinal model and issues pertaining to relationships 
(strategic and otherwise) between those on the Court at a particular time.
appointed by Democratic presidents tend to be liberal whereas those appointed by 
Republican presidents tend be conservative. When the justices of the U.S. Supreme 
Court disagree on the disposition of an appeal, the Court tends to split in predictable 
ways. For example, when the Court split 5 to 4 in the late 1990s, it would usually 
(though not always) be the case that Justices Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter 
would be on one side of the split, whereas Justices Scalia, Thomas, Rehnquist, and 
Kennedy would be on the other side of the split. With the positions of the four 
justices on each side of the median reasonably well-entrenched, the ultimate 
disposition of the case would frequently be determined by the so-called “swing” 
justice, Justice O’Connor.6
Martin and Quinn provide compelling empirical evidence of the tendency of 
U.S. Supreme Court justices to split in predictable ways.7 For example, the figure 
below depicts the “ideal point” distribution of the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court 
in the 2000-2001 term. These ideal point distributions represent the ideological 
predispositions of the justices based on the Bayesian estimation of a one-dimensional 
item response theory model using a computationally intensive Markov chain Monte 
Carlo process. From left to right (and correspondingly moving from more liberal to 
more conservative) are Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer, O’Connor, 
Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer were 
appointed by President Bill Clinton, a Democrat. All the other justices were 
appointed by Republican Presidents. Interestingly, despite the diversity in policy 
preferences, the U.S. Supreme Court renders unanimous decisions in approximately 
40 per cent of the appeals it hears (see Figure I).8
We have analyzed the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada using Martin 
and Quinn’s methodology.9 The analysis shows that Canadian Supreme Court
6 This is, of course, a caricature of the dynamics of the U.S. Supreme Court. See Lawrence S. 
Wrightsman, The Psychology o f the Supreme Court (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) at ix 
(“Individual justices are not just stereotyped; they are pigeonholed into conservative or liberal camps. 
And while these classifications reflect their votes and justifications in certain types of cases, as this book 
documents, the decisions and votes of each justice are more complexly determined than their simply 
reacting to their ideological bent. For example, in the 2004-2005 term, 24 decisions were 5 to 4; the 
conservative majority on the Court held together on only five. In eight of these cases, one of the 
conservatives formed a majority with the liberals.”).
7 See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, “Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999” (2002) 10 Political Analysis 134; Martin et al., supra 
note 2; Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Lee Epstein, “The Median Justice on the U.S. Supreme 
Court (Locating the Constitutional Center—Centrist Judges and Mainstream Values: A 
Multidisciplinary Exploration)” (2005) 83 N.C.L. Rev. 1275; Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, 
“Assessing Preference Change on the U.S. Supreme Court” (2007) 23 J. L. Econ. & Org. 303. Martin 
and Quinn maintain a website on which they report updated empirical findings as new decisions are 
rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court, online: Martin-Quinn Scores <http://mqscores.wustl.edu/>.
8 See Epstein & Knight, supra note 5 at 41.
9 Alarie & Green, supra note 4; Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, “The Reasonable Justice: An 
Empirical Analysis of Frank Iacobucci’s Career on the Supreme Court o f Canada” (2007) 57 U.T.L.J. 
195. We also undertook a more “direct” method of analyzing the connection between justices’ votes and 
their ideology by categorizing votes in particular areas o f law as “liberal” and “conservative”. 
Consistent with the results using Martin and Quinn’s methodology, we found a weak connection 
between a justice’s voting pattern and the party o f the appointing Prime Minister (Alarie & Green, supra
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note 4). This methodology has also found a connection in the U.S. between a justice’s votes and the 
party of the appointing President, particularly in the area of civil rights and liberties (see Nancy C. 
Staudt, Lee Epstein & Peter J. Wiedenbeck, “The Ideological Component of Judging in the Taxation 
Context” Wash. L. Rev. [forthcoming in 2008]).
justices may approach the decision-making process quite differently from U.S. 
Supreme Court justices. More specifically, with the exception of Justice L’Heureux- 
Dubé, the justices seem to be closely clustered with each other, with considerable 
overlap in the distributions of their ideal points. The following figure presents the 
ideal point distributions for Justices Major, Arbour, Iacobucci, Binnie, LeBel, 
McLachlin, Gonthier, Bastarache, and L’Heureux-Dubé. Four of the justices— 
Arbour, Binnie, LeBel, and Bastarache—were appointed by Liberal Prime Ministers. 
The five remaining justices were appointed by Progressive Conservative Prime 
Ministers. The results demonstrate not only how clustered our justices are (with the 
obvious exception of Justice L’Heureux-Dubé), but also how ineffective the 
appointing Prime Minister’s party is likely to be as a proxy for the Justice’s policy 
preferences (see Figure 2).
Whereas the U.S. Supreme Court renders unanimous judgments about 40 per 
cent of the time, the Supreme Court of Canada renders unanimous decisions 
approximately 60 per cent of the time.10 This higher rate of unanimity suggests that 
the Canadian Supreme Court is more oriented towards consensus in decision­
making, although it is also consistent with other possible explanations, such as 
higher levels of logrolling (i.e. only apparent, not real, consensus), dispositional 
similarities among justices, and a less ideologically divisive docket (i.e. cases that 
are easier “on the merits”). One reason to suspect that the Supreme Court of Canada 
may face a less ideologically divisive docket would be that in certain criminal cases 
(where, for example, there is a dissent at the appellate court) accused persons may 
appeal as of right.11 Another factor affecting the higher rate of unanimity on the 
Supreme Court of Canada may be the Court’s frequent practice of sitting in panel 
sizes of seven or five instead of as a full panel of nine justices. The effect of smaller 
panel sizes may be mitigated to some extent, however, by the Court’s tendency to 
assign fewer justices to appeals that are considered to be less controversial or 
divisive. Most important Charter appeals, for example, will be heard by all nine 
justices.
There are a number of other possible explanations for the differences observed 
between decision-making at the Supreme Court of Canada and the U.S. Supreme 
Court that have not yet been organized around any type of theory of decision-making 
or difference in approach to judging. However, in light of the empirical evidence, it 
is clear that the Supreme Court of Canada can be characterized as one on which there 
is a higher degree of consensus generally and, where disagreements do arise, there is 
less divisiveness along partisan lines than at the U.S. Supreme Court. We now turn to 
a discussion of how one might make sense of these observed differences.
10 See e.g. Peter McCormick, ‘“With Respect...’-Levels o f Disagreement on the Lamer Court, 1990- 
2000” (2003) 48 McGill L.J. 89 at 97. According to McCormick, of the 959 appeals heard by the Lamer 
court from 1990-2000, 58.4 per cent were decided unanimously.
11 Over the period beginning with the start o f the 2000 term to the end o f the 2006 term, the Supreme 
Court o f Canada heard on average 14.6 appeals per term as of right, comprising 16 per cent o f the 
Court’s docket. See Supreme Court of Canada, “Statistics 1997 to 2007”, online: S.C.C. 
<http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/information/statistics/HTML/cat3_e.asp>.
Id eo lo g y  and C ooperation
Courts such as the U.K. House of Lords, the Australian High Court, the Supreme 
Court of Canada, and the U.S. Supreme Court, vary across at least two important 
dimensions. The first dimension relates to the degree to which ideological views or 
policy preferences influence justices’ decisions. This influence could arise 
consciously (where justices directly consider and vote in accordance with their 
ideological views) or unconsciously (where the views act indirectly on justices’ 
votes, such as through unconsidered assumptions).12 At one extreme of this 
dimension, the justices of a court would be described as being ideologically 
“committed” or “interested”. At the other end of the spectrum, justices of a court 
would be described as being ideologically “disinterested” or “uncommitted.” Of 
course, it will sometimes and perhaps even usually be that the justices of the court 
vary significantly in the strength and nature of their ideological commitments.
The second dimension along which courts vary is the collegiality or 
cooperativeness of the decision-making process in which the justices engage. At one 
end of the spectrum will be courts in which there is little or no give-and-take, where 
justices regard it as their duty to independently and without interference from 
colleagues formulate an opinion as to the appropriate disposition of each appeal. 
These courts could be described as uncooperative, not necessarily pejoratively, but 
simply in the sense that each justice is independent and provides, in some sense, an 
“independent draw” as to the merits (whether this is appropriately regarded as having 
an ideological valence or not) of each appeal. Such courts may value independence 
of mind in the belief that the best way to ensure coherence and consistency in 
reasoning is to leave each justice to express her own unadulterated private judgment 
as clearly as possible. Alternatively, personal or ideological differences may 
themselves serve to limit effective cooperation. One would expect such a court to 
regularly issue plurality opinions.
At the other end of this spectrum, courts could be described as being collegial, 
open to teamwork, and cooperative. Justices on these courts may value the exchange 
and testing of ideas and reasons in decision-making. In such cases, the justices’ goal 
would be, where possible, to speak with a fully-formed and well-tested united voice. 
The interest in speaking with a single voice might be premised on a number of 
beliefs, such as the value of clarifying the law and consolidating the possibly 
differing approaches taken to discrete legal issues by lower courts.13 Alternatively, as
12 See Eric A. Posner, “Does Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter?: Implications of Judicial Bias Studies 
for Legal and Constitutional Reform” University of Chicago Law and Economics, Olin Working Paper 
No. 377 (2008), online: Social Science Research Network <http://ssm.com/abstract_id=1082055> at 6 
(distinguishing between judges who allow their political biases to impact their decisions and those who 
do not as well as between explicit or implicit bias).
13 Some courts, including the Supreme Court o f Canada, have a practice of from time to time o f issuing 
per curiam judgments that are not identified as having been authored by any particular justice. The 
Supreme Court of Canada has done this a number of times, including Blaikie v. Quebec (Attorney 
General), [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1016; Reference re Secession o f Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217; Reference re 
Same-Sex Marriage, 2004 SCC 79, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698.
discussed below, the cooperation may arise not from deliberation on the particular 
case (even in accordance with precedent), but from justices trading off votes across 
cases or areas of law in a judicial version of legislative logrolling.
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Recognizing that courts could vary along these two dimensions—degree of 
ideological commitment and degree of cooperativeness—suggests a four-quadrant 
framework for analyzing the decision-making processes of multi-member courts or 
panels. Quadrant one courts are ideologically committed and uncooperative. 
Quadrant two courts are ideologically uncommitted and uncooperative. Quadrant 
three courts are ideologically committed and cooperative. Finally, quadrant four 
courts are ideologically uncommitted and cooperative. The following descriptions 
attempt to define the extremes in each quadrant (i.e. the comers), although any 
particular court likely lies inside these extremes.
Quadrant One: Ideologically Committed and Uncooperative
This first quadrant is associated with the attitudinal model of judicial decision­
making, where justices are assumed to decide cases principally in a way that satisfies 
their own policy preferences without regard to the strategic possibilities that might 
arise by cooperating with other justices in any given case.14 Courts that are situated
14 The attitudinal model of decision-making has for decades been popular among political scientists and is 
probably the most well-known and most frequently deployed model in the political science literature. 
See, e.g. David W. Rhode & Harold J. Spaeth, Supreme Court Decision-Making (San Francisco: W.H.
in quadrant one—that is, courts whose justices are ideologically committed and 
whose justices are uncooperative—will have certain predictable features. One of 
these features is a multiplicity of opinions with an overall higher rate of concurring 
opinions and dissents than the courts in other quadrants, all else the same. The 
number of opinions and the rate of dissent will be higher for two reasons. First, the 
lack of cooperation means that individual justices will place little or no independent 
value (aside, perhaps, from the value associated with shirking) on joining an opinion 
authored by a colleague. A justice will sign on to another’s opinion only where she 
has a high degree of ideological consonance with the other justice in the particular 
appeal. Each justice will have reached the opinion on her own. If there is 
disagreement, a justice will prefer to author her own opinion rather than try (likely 
fruitlessly) to persuade her colleague to modify the reasons given for a certain 
outcome.15 This first reason—uncooperativeness—suggests that justices will 
experience little or no gravitational pull towards other justices along the ideological 
spectrum based on a stand-alone interest in agreement.
Second, the tendency towards a proliferation of opinions will be reinforced by 
the presence of certain preexisting ideological commitments. These commitments 
will mean that justices, or at least coalitions of ideologically similar justices, will less 
frequently agree on the merits of a particular decision and the reasons justifying that 
decision than in circumstances where justices lack these ideological commitments. 
This second reason relates to the stickiness of justices to a certain position they have 
reached on an appeal. An ideologically committed court will have little interest in 
agreeing for agreement’s sake and disagreement will arise where sharply defined 
ideological interests incline the justices towards a different disposition of an appeal.
Quadrant Two: Ideologically Uncommitted and Uncooperative
Courts that are in quadrant two—that is, courts that are ideologically uncommitted 
and uncooperative—will also exhibit certain predictable features. Provided that the 
range of ideologies of justices on quadrant one courts is broader than the likely range 
of ideologically uncommitted independent opinions of legal merit, a quadrant two 
court will tend to exhibit higher levels of agreement than quadrant one courts. As in 
quadrant one courts, justices on quadrant two courts will place little or no value on 
agreeing for agreement’s sake, but each justice will engage in a determined exercise
Freeman, 1976) at 134-157; Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the 
Attitudinal Model (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Frank B. Cross, “Political 
Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance” (1997) 92 Nw. 
U.L.Rev. 251 at 265-279.
15 This increase in the number of opinions holds all else constant such as, for example, workload. Justices 
may consider whether the (ideological) benefits of writing a separate opinion are greater than the 
opportunity cost (due to the time-cost of writing a decision), which may increase as the workload 
increases. For example, for the implications of workload in the context of decisions of Chief Justices 
of different courts, see Tracey George & Albert Yoon, “Chief Justices: The Limits o f Attitudinal 
Theory and the Possible Paradox of Managerial Judging” Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research 
Paper No. 07-24 (2007), online: Social Science Research Network <http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=1001247> (discussing the impact o f workload on judicial decision-making).
to evaluate the case on its legal merits rather than on the basis of personal policy 
preferences. The second quadrant is associated with what legal theorists might call 
legal positivism and formalism—the idea that each case has a most valid or most 
defensible legal outcome, and that an ideologically uncommitted justice will strive to 
uncover the true legal merits of each case and decide on that basis. Justices of a 
quadrant two court may regard cooperation as suspicious, because it would suggest 
the possibility that a justice is open to compromising her own view of the underlying 
legal merits of an appeal in order to achieve some extraneous, distinctly non-legal or 
policy goal. On such courts, suspicion and distrust of cooperation would influence 
the rate of dissenting or concurring opinions. However, because the legal authorities 
relevant to each appeal would be common to each justice, one would expect there to 
be less room for difference on ideologically uncommitted and uncooperative courts 
(quadrant two) than ideologically committed uncooperative courts (quadrant one).16
Quadrant Three: Ideologically Committed and Cooperative
An ideologically committed court that is cooperative would be in quadrant three. Its 
justices would be open to deciding cases on the basis of policy preferences and, like 
the legal realists, would probably question the possibility of judging neutrally or 
objectively on the legal merits. Unlike their counterparts on quadrant one courts, the 
justices of a quadrant three court would see the value in selectively cooperating in 
order to achieve a better overall match between their own personal policy 
preferences and the outcomes produced by the court as a whole. Cooperation could 
play out in one of two ways. The more attractive way would be for justices to 
understand and acknowledge each other’s ideological commitments and use those 
commitments as mutually beneficial foils to produce well-reasoned and sharply 
divided opinions.17 The less attractive way for cooperation to play out would be for 
the court’s output to more closely resemble the output of a legislature, where 
members are willing to trade votes in order to promote their own individual agendas. 
Thus, in this less attractive case, quadrant three courts would not be naively 
attitudinal, but would instead be strategically sophisticated and more likely to engage 
in episodic logrolling with other justices.18 Because of the possibility of negative 
cooperation, it would be a mistake to conclude from a justice’s decision in any given 
case that the justice had a genuine belief in the appropriateness of the outcome 
reached. A quadrant three court would tend to exhibit more agreement and less
16 This will be the case so long as the variation in ideologically uncommitted assessments of legal merits 
varies less than the range o f ideological commitments on quadrant one courts. This seems likely, though 
it will not necessarily be the case and would depend on the particular appointments process used for a 
given court and the composition of the court’s docket.
17 There is a case to be made that such a court would appropriately belong in quadrant one rather than 
quadrant three if the votes of the justices are not affected by deliberation. Moreover, to the extent that 
the justices are willing to revisit their judgments, such courts will begin to look like quadrant four 
courts.
18 This is consistent with the literature surrounding the “strategic” model of adjudication. For treatments of 
the strategic model, see Melinda Gann Hall & Paul Brace, “Order in the Courts: A Neo-Institutional 
Approach to Judicial Consensus” (1989) 42 Western Political Quarterly 391; Epstein & Knight, supra 
note 5 at 1-18; Forrest Maltzman, James F. Spriggs & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Crafting Law on the Supreme 
Court: The Collegial Game (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
concurring or dissenting opinions than a quadrant one court. It is unclear whether a 
quadrant three court would exhibit more or less consensus than a quadrant two court, 
however, and the result would probably depend on the variety and intensity of the 
policy preferences of the justices of a quadrant three court, which would influence 
the mix of sharply divided opinions versus logrolling outcomes that would prevail.
Quadrant Four: Ideologically Uncommitted and Cooperative
On an ideologically uncommitted and cooperative court, justices would tend not to 
steadfastly adhere to certain positions without taking a close look at the legal merits 
of the case and taking the existing law seriously. Further, the cooperative aspect 
means that the justices would be open to learning from and influencing each other in 
a good faith attempt at understanding the legal merits of the appeal, and forging the 
reasoning that is most compelling. In the best cases, quadrant four courts will 
produce judgments that exhibit higher levels of consensus and a higher quality of 
reasoning and decision-making than any of the other three types of courts. The public 
good function of its decisions in the sense of more clearly settled case law may 
increase as a result of higher levels of consensus and quality of judgment. Open 
judicial minds, abundant legal talent, mutual respect, diverse personal experiences 
and backgrounds, and effective communication would characterize an ideal quadrant 
four court.
Id e o l o g y  a n d  C o o p e r a t i o n  o n  t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  o f  C a n a d a
Depending on the variety and intensity of policy preferences of justices of any 
particular court, it is difficult and perhaps impossible to determine conclusively in 
which quadrant a court is situated simply by quantitatively analyzing the votes of the 
justices in the appeals heard over a particular period of time. Qualitative measures 
would also be necessary to make a compelling diagnosis. Nevertheless, there are 
some quantitative measures that flow from the descriptions of the four quadrants that 
will suggest in which quadrant a given court is operating. All else the same, the 
lowest rates of observed consensus will be associated with quadrant one courts and 
the highest rates of observed consensus will be associated with quadrant four courts. 
The relative rates of consensus for quadrant two and quadrant three courts is unclear, 
and would depend on such factors as the legal talent of the justices in quadrant two 
(for example, greater legal ability may lead to more consensus) and the range and 
intensity of policy preferences of justices in quadrant three (for example, broader 
scope for logrolling may lead to more observed consensus).19 As noted in Part 2, the 
observed rate of unanimity on the Supreme Court of Canada (about 60 per cent) has 
been higher than the rate of unanimity on the U.S. Supreme Court (about 40 per 
cent) in recent years. However, a higher rate of consensus alone does not necessarily 
mean that the Supreme Court of Canada has been outperforming the U.S. Supreme
19 It is possible theoretically, too, that a quadrant three court could exhibit even more consensus than a 
quadrant four court, depending on the mix of judicial policy preferences and by relieving some 
constraints on bargaining (for example, by allowing for side-payments rather than in-kind, vote-for- 
vote, trades).
Court. To move towards understanding the implications of these differences, it is 
necessary to determine: (a) as a positive matter, which quadrant each Court appears 
to be located in; and (b) the normative implications of the location.
1. In Which Quadrant is each Court Located?
The U.S. Supreme Court appears to be in quadrant one. The systematic and 
predictable dispersion of the voting behaviour of the justices seems to indicate a lack 
of cooperation on the Court (that is, it appears that the U.S. Supreme Court is either 
in quadrant one or two). Evidence of ideologically interested voting (that is, either 
quadrant one or three) is apparent in the strong connection of voting in many areas of 
law with the appointing President’s party or other indicators of ideology. While 
individual justices may be in different quadrants and the location may vary by area of 
law, the Court seems best characterized overall as being in quadrant one. The 
hallmark of quadrant one courts is a tendency for each justice to vote in accordance 
with her own personal policy preferences, which is consistent with the attitudinal 
model of decision-making.
It is considerably less clear which quadrant best characterizes the justices of the 
Supreme Court of Canada over the post -Charter period. As in the U.S., different 
justices may be best characterized as being in different quadrants, depending on their 
own personal philosophy regarding the role of the justices on the Court. The clearest 
example is the difference between Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, who exhibits marked 
tendencies towards attitudinal voting, and Justices Iacobucci and Cory, who appear 
to be best characterized as quadrant four justices. Given the observed voting patterns, 
however, the Court as a whole could be in any one of the four quadrants.
The evidence from the Supreme Court of Canada is weakly consistent with 
ideologically committed justices—that is, the Court could be in either quadrant one 
or three. If the range of the justices’ actual policy preferences happens to be narrower 
than in the U.S., then the Canadian Court could be in quadrant one. Given the 
“brokerage” model of politics in Canada in the past and the lack of significant 
differences in policy preferences in most areas across parties (particularly in the 
1980s and 1990s), the appointees to the Court may have been largely similar 
ideologically.20 The resulting voting behaviour would appear to be convergent, with 
small differences in voting patterns between justices appointed by Prime Ministers of 
each party corresponding to the small differences in ideology between the parties and 
appointees. Alternatively, the justices may be voting in accordance with their policy 
preferences in a strategic way through logrolling. That would place the Court in 
quadrant three. The apparent similarity in voting would merely reflect the fact that 
the votes that each justice cares about in connection with her ideological preference 
have been traded off in some other area where she appears to be voting against her 
interest.
20 See e.g. Harold D. Clarke et al., “Absent Mandate: Canadian Electoral Politics in an Era of 
Restructuring” in Hugh G. Thorbum & Alan Whitehom, eds., Party Politics in Canada, 8th ed. 
(Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 2001).
More empirical work is needed to assess whether there are particular types of 
cases (such as federalism or criminal law) that are particularly divisive along party 
lines in Canada. If there are such types of cases, then analyzing the voting patterns in 
these areas should reveal whether there are partisan differences in voting, at least in 
these areas. If so, the Court may well be in quadrant one. The higher rate of 
agreement of the justices in the majority of areas of law may dominate the 
differences in the divisive areas when considering the Court’s decisions 
quantitatively as a whole. Quadrant three would also be a possibility.21 There is 
some evidence that the initial differences between justices (as opposed to particular 
issues) do not vary significantly. Ostberg and Wetstein have ranked justices on a 
scale of -2 (very conservative) to +2 (very liberal) based on an analysis of newspaper 
editorials on the justices at the time of their appointment.22 Justices appointed by the 
conservative Prime Ministers have had mixed rankings, with four justices considered 
to be conservative or very conservative, five considered liberal or moderately liberal, 
and one essentially neutral (Justice Iacobucci). Those appointed by Liberal Prime 
Ministers, on the other hand, were predominantly liberal, with nine justices 
considered to be liberal or moderately liberal, one conservative (Justice LeBel), and 
one neutral (Justice Deschamps). Interestingly, these assessments of personal policy 
preferences do not appear to correspond in more than a weak way with the voting 
differences of justices upon appointment.
The pattern of judging by the Court may also be consistent with non-ideological 
voting. The Court, for example, could be in quadrant four. The appointment process 
may have resulted in justices who do not vote in any particular ideological pattern 
but who deliberate together to reach decisions. The resulting narrow distribution of 
voting patterns would then reflect the outcome of deliberation rather than the 
influence of initial policy preferences. Alternatively, the Court could be in quadrant 
two—where the justices do not vote according to personal policy preferences and do 
not cooperate—so long as the justices tend to independently arrive at the same 
conclusion. This result is possible but it seems more likely that the high level of 
agreement on the Court in this period is not associated with independent voting, but 
rather with cooperation. Regardless, if the Court is in either quadrant two or quadrant 
four, it is not at an extreme of ideological disinterestedness, since the empirical 
evidence does reveal a weak connection between votes and two indicators of political 
ideology (appointing Prime Minister’s party and newspaper editorials).23
21 See Alarie & Green, supra note 4 (discussing the differences in preferences by parties in particular 
areas).
22 See C.L. Ostberg & Matthew E. Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making in the Supreme Court o f Canada 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007) at 55. These scores, which were set (for most 
but not all of the justices) in the period 1982 to 2004, are based on an analysis of editorials in nine 
Canadian regional papers. The methodology was originally developed for the U.S. Supreme Court. See 
Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, “Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices” 
(1989) 83 American Political Science Review 557.
23 See Alarie & Green, supra note 4.
2. In Which Quadrant Should the Court be Located?
What are we to make of these observations? Clearly, more empirical work is needed 
to determine the quadrant that best characterizes the Supreme Court of Canada in the 
post-Charter period. Cooperation and collegiality are terms that seem universally 
good; after all, who would want to be described as uncooperative or uncollegial? 
However, there are both positive and negative dimensions to cooperation and 
collegiality that underlie this discussion. These positive and negative dimensions 
have important implications for the optimal location of the Court within the four 
quadrant framework. The positive dimension of cooperation manifests itself in the 
form of active deliberation. Justices examine the facts and arguments and discuss the 
optimal decision and all the various alternatives in an open and forthright manner. 
The result is, at best, more than a sum of independent preferences. It is a better 
decision reached through reasoned debate and collective and thorough testing of 
ideas and proposals.
Given that cooperation can lead to stronger decisions, the question that 
naturally follows is whether reasoned debate is best fostered through disinterested 
justices or interested justices. Disinterested justices may have the benefit of not 
starting from a particular position but may not be able to advance each argument in 
the strongest possible form or may not have significantly different personal 
experiences than justices of similar backgrounds. The clash of ideas may be greater 
with justices that are initially polarized ideologically and yet open to debate, reason, 
and persuasion. As Cox and Miles note, diversity on the bench may lead to greater 
accuracy of decision-making.24 Alternatively, even if justices do not converge on a 
unanimous decision, diversity on the court may at least allow different voices to be 
expressed in the most forceful way possible.25 The worst case on this view would be 
a court with ideologically similar justices. Not only would they not start from a 
neutral position, but either may not have a sufficient divergence to generate 
vigorously reasoned debate or, perhaps worse still, exhibit ideological polarization— 
that is, the similarity of the views in one direction reinforces voting in that direction 
in absence of significant opposition. Recent empirical studies in the U.S., for 
example, have found that there is a significant difference in voting if a panel of 
justices is all Democrats, all Republicans, or mixed. Uniformly Democratic or 
Republican panels tend to have more extreme voting patterns (in the liberal and 
conservative directions, respectively).26
Another issue that arises from cooperation is the counterpoint to the benefits of 
active deliberation. More specifically, the appointment of ideologically interested
24 See Adam B. Cox & Thomas Miles, “Judging the Voting Rights Act” Colum. L. Rev. [forthcoming in 
2008] (discussing the value o f diversity in decision-making and, in particular, diversity in race). As 
noted below, it could be argued that the strong form arguments could come from the lawyers of the 
parties but this depends on the nature of the market for legal services. See e.g. Gillian Hadfield, “The 
Price o f Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System” (2000) 98 Mich. L. Rev. 953.
25 Cox & Miles, supra note 24.
26 See Sunstein et al., supra note 2 and Cox & Miles, supra note 24 on panel effects.
justices may give rise to the risk of logrolling rather than deliberation. Logrolling 
will typically involve unprincipled trade-offs between outcomes in different areas of 
law. While that may be problematic in the legislative context, it is likely to be much 
more problematic for justices whose role is to decide individual appeals involving 
particular parties in specific areas of law. Justices who trade votes across different 
areas of law in order to satisfy their preferred policy outcome in a particular area at 
the expense of voting against their sincere judgment in another appeal risk distorting 
the law in inappropriate ways. Logrolling would allow a court to escape the ordinary 
constraints imposed by genuine voting. Genuine voting in each case would result in 
the median voter’s preferences prevailing in each and every appeal, whereas the 
median voter’s preference would not necessarily prevail in the presence of logrolling. 
The risks associated with logrolling will vary with the composition of the court. The 
worst risks will arise in an ideologically interested court that is widely split. If there 
is logrolling, the shifts in voting are likely to be significant. Logrolling may still exist 
if the justices are ideologically interested but have similar initial preferences (as 
could be the case in Canada). However, the significance may be less as they are 
trading across relatively similar initial starting points. Finally, there is little or no risk 
of logrolling if the court is composed of ideologically disinterested justices.
All else the same, and subject to caveats regarding logrolling and the possibly 
countervailing benefits of ideological commitments, some tentative observations can 
be made based on the foregoing analysis. First, on the whole, cooperation is likely to 
be superior to uncooperativeness, since justices can learn from each other’s 
perspectives, personal experiences, and thoughts. Second, a lack of explicit 
ideological commitment is likely to be preferable to known explicit ideological 
commitment, since it is not necessary that each justice actually vote in a manner 
reflecting her policy preferences to realize the benefits of cooperation. Finally, 
diversity of personal experience on the court is likely to be superior to homogeneity. 
It tentatively follows that the highest functioning courts are likely to be cooperative 
courts with ideologically uncommitted justices from diverse backgrounds (quadrant 
four courts). If justices are ideologically interested, it is less clear whether it would 
be better to try to foster cooperation (quadrant three) or uncooperative decision­
making (quadrant one). Ideologically committed justices that decide cases 
cooperatively may reach polarized decisions (as shown in the U.S. literature on 
unmixed panel effects). Worse still, they may engage in harmful cooperation in the 
form of logrolling. On the other hand, a quadrant three court that engages in positive 
cooperation in a subset of cases may deliberate and bring out the strength in the 
opposing positions in a way that may approach the efficacy of a quadrant four court 
staffed with ideologically uncommitted justices from diverse backgrounds.
Im plications fo r  th e  Appointm ents  Debate
As explained above, it is unclear from the available empirical evidence exactly 
where the post-Charter Supreme Court of Canada is located in the framework we 
have developed. What is clear, however, is that the location matters significantly for 
the appointments process. If the Court is regarded as being an institution that ought 
to neutrally apply the “law” in an area, the policy prescription, to the extent possible,
would be to steer the Court towards quadrants two or four through the appointments 
process. If, as seems more reasonable, the Court is viewed as having a normatively 
desirable or at least irreducible policymaking function, the optimal location is less 
clear. The appropriate appointments process will depend on a number of factors such 
as the perceived costs of judicial logrolling, the desirability of sharing information 
and trading personal experiences among justices, the value of active deliberation, and 
the desire to calibrate the policymaking preferences of the Court in accordance to 
changing public opinion.
If the primary desire of the appointments process is to reduce the connection 
between voting and ideological preferences, a neutral committee system would 
appear to be preferable. The focus would be on choosing a justice who is able to 
understand and make the best “neutral” policy decision, rather than one connected to 
a particular ideological position.27 However, the risk would be a loss of connection 
to public opinion. Further, as Hogg notes, there is a potential for such a committee 
system to result in a “safe” but uninspired appointment that does not lead to any 
significant changes in the law or add to the collective wisdom of the justices.28 If the 
Court does deal with irreducibly political questions, it may be preferable to promote 
a diversity of political commitments on the Court.29 Although it could be argued that 
a strong presentation of competing views is best brought about by the lawyers for 
each side, the effectiveness of that assumes a neutral market for representation and 
receptive justices.30 The neutral committee system, on the other hand, has a 
corresponding gain of a lower risk of significant harms from logrolling (since 
logrolling may occur but would be relatively less dangerous or costly).
Indeed, there may be merit in an appointments process such as that in the U.S. 
which results in a more politically polarized court. The risk would be the enhanced 
possibility of both logrolling and less predictability in decisions over time. The gain 
would be the potential for a greater connection to the prevailing norms of society. If 
there was vigorous political competition for forming the government, the 
composition of the court could and likely would be changed with new appointments 
to reflect these views. Of course, it may be that vigorous competition would be 
insufficient to create a divergence of opinions on the court. For example, the post- 
Charter convergence of voting may already reflect keen competition for political 
power but reveal the largely similar policy positions of the parties. The result is a 
court that is harder to change—because in the event of a significant change in public 
opinion on an issue, the bulk of existing justices vote in a similar fashion, but does
27Posner, supra note 12 at 16, discusses the difference between legal competence (writing clear, 
consistent judgments for example) versus legislative competence (being able to understand the 
implications of the decision). He argues that if  there is a “right” (most efficient, in his model) answer, 
the best option would be to appoint qualified, unbiased justices. However, if  there is not, there is a 
concern about whether “ideological extremism ‘crowds out’ judicial competence” (that is, whether the 
pool o f competent, ideologically extreme justices is big enough).
28 Peter Hogg, “Appointment of Justice Marshall Rothstein to the Supreme Court o f Canada” (2006) 44 
Osgoode Hall L.J. 527.
29 See Posner, supra note 12.
30 Hadfield, supra note 24.
not necessarily point to a need for change the appointments process. The Canadian 
appointments process may therefore already respond to public opinion, it is just that 
public opinion itself is not polarized.
These choices across interest and cooperation, of course, may not be 
independent. To the extent that the system fosters or leads to more ideologically 
interested justices, it may be connected to a less cooperative court. The personalities 
may be less willing to compromise and the degree of cooperation will depend on the 
options for logrolling (such as the degree to which votes in different areas are seen as 
commensurable). On the other hand, less ideologically interested justices may be, 
though not necessarily are, more cooperative, as they have less of a strong initial 
position on any particular issue. Further, it should be noted that the level of 
explanation of voting by ideological factors in the empirical literature is not 
particularly high. There is a range of other factors which could explain voting 
patterns, including the precedents in the particular area or the context of particular 
cases. Altering the appointments process around ideological concerns may be much 
less important than ensuring that justices are maximally competent to undertake the 
necessary legal analysis.31
The ideological interests or commitments (or lack thereof) of justices on a court 
and the type of appointments process used to select justices raises the issue of the 
strength of the connection between the justice’s opinions and prevailing public 
opinion. The U.S. appointments process combined with the underlying divergence in 
political opinions appears to be connected to split voting on the Court.32 The result 
of this split is the importance of the median justice. The justices on the extremes can 
be expected to vote in a more or less predictable fashion on each case, and therefore 
the ostensible goal of the appointments process is to influence the voter in the 
middle. This focus on a single or small set of justices makes the identity of the 
leavers and joiners on the Court important given the Court’s role in a range of 
important social issues.33 Replacing a left-leaning justice with a right-leaning justice 
can make a considerable difference. In the U.S., Republican Presidents may attempt
31 See Posner, supra note 12.
32 Some political scientists have attributed the sharp rise in disagreement on the U.S. Supreme Court to the 
role o f different Chief Justices, and not to the appointments process. This may also be an important 
mechanism of influence. Since, however, the Chief Justice is usually selected in manner similar to the 
ordinary appointments process in the U.S., the same arguments apply to the Chief Justice and this 
mechanism of influence.
33 This importance assumes that a justice’s voting is stable or predictable over time or, at very least, in the 
short run. See e.g. Lee Epstein & Valerie Hoekstra, “Do Political Preferences Change: A Longitudinal 
Study o f U.S. Supreme Court Justices” (1998) 60 Journal of Politics 801, and Lee Epstein et al., 
“Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When and How Important?” Nw. U.L. Rev. 
[forthcoming in 2008]. There has been no clear pattern of change in voting patterns by justices over time 
on the Supreme Court o f Canada (Alarie & Green, supra note 4). The implications of changes, however, 
will depend on the initial starting points. Even if  justices’ votes may change in either direction (more 
liberal or more conservative), if  the change is relatively small it may not make a difference in the 
ultimate outcome on a heavily split court if  the change occurs in the justices at either extreme. It will be 
the shifts in the justices towards the middle that will matter most.
to add justices to the right of the median justice, and Democratic Presidents to the 
left of tiie median.34 Under the Canadian appointments process, the individual policy 
preferences of any given justice appear to make less of a difference to the outcomes 
of appeals.35
The difference between the importance of a single vote in Canada and the U.S. 
may in part result from the lower degree of politicization in the Canadian process 
(both in terms of the political battles for appointments and the identity of the 
individuals appointed). Which is preferable? Stability has the virtue of certainty for 
potential parties in cases before the Court. It means parties may be better able to 
predict how the Court will vote over time.36 Such stability and predictability may 
mean that parties may make more efficient decisions in arranging their affairs (such 
as in designing contracts or taking precautionary measures) to avoid litigation. It may 
also mean that where disputes do arise, parties will be better able to predict the 
outcome of litigation, thereby leading to more efficient decisions as to whether to 
bring, settle, or contest a lawsuit.37
What does this mean for the Supreme Court of Canada? The justices may have 
less divergence of opinion because they were ideologically similar at the time of 
appointment. In this case, the Court’s median will be hard to influence through new 
appointments. However, this may merely reflect a greater correspondence in 
society’s underlying political views. Changing the direction of the Court would be 
difficult, although seemingly unnecessary. If, in the future, significant schisms 
develop in the underlying political opinion, the appointments process will reflect this 
adjustment (albeit with a considerable lag). If, on the other hand, Canada is in
34 For a discussion of appointments and changing attitudes, see e.g., Epstein et al., supra note 33.
35 If all or most of the justices have centrist policy preferences, then it would be harder to shift or change 
the direction of voting, regardless of whether the justices are uncooperative (as appears to be the case in 
the U.S.) or cooperative (in the sense of logrolling). The ultimate voting outcomes will therefore tend to 
be more stable over time (although the coalitions may change). The same result holds if  the justices are 
all competent and ideologically uncommitted. However, there could be changes in particular areas of 
law where there is a significant difference in ideological views. This difference (such as over criminal or 
minority rights issues) could be hidden within the apparent overall agreement. If so, a Prime Minister 
may be able to change the voting in a particular area but this may not be reflected in the more global 
measures of how justices vote and their implied policy preferences.
36 See Posner, supra note 12 at 8.
37 There is perhaps a more difficult issue relating to what this stability means for the connection of the 
decisions of a court to the values of the public in its jurisdiction. It could be argued, for example, that 
there are virtues to stability such as when interpreting the Constitution. Public opinion may be in favour 
of imposing a cost on parties without political power and the stability of the Court in sober oversight 
over the bending of politicians to such views could be seen as valuable. In such instances, the desire 
may be for a system which limits the possibility o f an ideologically split Court. On the other hand, the 
Court may lag behind public opinion where we may wish for legal rules and interpretations to change. 
Posner, supra note 12, uses the example of the Lochner decision in the U.S. where public opinion 
moved sharply to the left but the U.S. Supreme Court remained to the right. In such cases, there may be 
arguments in favour of being able to shift the composition of the Court in a relatively short period of 
time. Further, it may be that attempting to appoint an ideologically disinterested court is impossible—  
that the ideology will merely depend on the ideological make-up of the appointing committee. In such a 
case, the resulting justices may be “safe”, resulting in a lack of connection to important changes in 
public opinion.
quadrant four (disinterested, cooperative justices), shifting towards a closer 
connection to public opinion, if felt desirable, might require a change in the 
appointments process.
Finally, there is another connection outside the Court that may be important 
here—although not strictly within the factors we are considering. The nature of 
appointments is, of course, not exogenous. The political parties may desire a 
particular make-up of the Court and appointments process. If the powerful political 
parties view the Court as more easily swung in one direction than another, they may 
be inclined to want to change the nature of the appointments when they are riding a 
wave of popularity. Alternatively, if there is vigorous political competition and the 
parties are sufficiently antagonistic to dramatic shifts away from their preferred 
ideological outcomes, they may wish to have a Court that is relatively independent. 
While the parties would lose at times when they are in power (as the Court may 
strike down legislation favourable to their political base), they experience less of a 
potential downside at times when they are out of power.38
This forum contribution is intended as the beginning of a discussion about the 
nature of the differences in decision-making on the Supreme Court of Canada and 
the U.S. Supreme Court. As Canadians, we should not be smug about our 
appointments process simply because we have a history of less partisan voting on the 
Supreme Court of Canada than on the U.S. Supreme Court. Nor should we 
necessarily change our system merely on the basis of a fear that a Prime Minister 
could at some point in the future make a string of ideologically motivated 
appointments. In order to choose the optimal appointment process, more work, both 
empirical and theoretical, is needed to understand the connection between the 
appointment process and the characteristics of the justices chosen and between those 
characteristics and voting behaviour. Given the high quality of decision-making on 
the Court in the post-Charter era, changes to the appointments process should be 
made carefully and on a solid foundation, rather than on unexamined empirical 
assumptions.
38 See e.g. Matthew Stephenson, ‘“When the Devil Turns’: The Political Foundations o f Independent 
Judicial Review” (2003) 32 J. Legal Stud. 59 and Posner, supra note 12.
